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Abstract
This study examines the short and long horizons wealth maximisation effect of financial 
institutions mergers, and their determinants in the pre- and post-merger periods. Results show 
that FIs mergers destroy share value for the bidding firms pursuing a Market penetration 
strategy. FIs are advised to pursue Market Development and Product Development strategies 
because they enable shareholders’ value creation in short and the long horizons. Local bank to 
bank mergers create shareholders value and enhance liquidity and economic value in the short 
run. Bank to Bank cross border mergers create value for bidders’ in the long term but are 
associated with high costs and higher risks. Shareholders value drives long-run economic value 
for North American banks, but it is adversely affected by credit risk appetite in Australasian 
bank focused mergers.
JEL: G01, G12, G2, G32, G34, E58, O43
Key Words: Shareholder Value; Financial crisis impact; Ring-fencing; Diversification Strategies; 
Economic Value Addition; Event Study and Buy and Hold methods.
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1. Introduction
Despite the limitations put in recent financial regulations, on diversification and 
conglomeration through ring-fencing, financial institutions are still diversifying and benefiting 
from regulatory arbitrage and immunity through mergers.
Between the great depression in the 1930s and the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis, there have been waves of financial stress followed by tightening regulations, then 
innovations to break those out followed by deregulations. The Recent financial crisis (2007-
2009), has led regulators to prohibit several growth strategies and financial institutions (FIs) 
diversification initiatives. Increasing capital buffers and limiting financial institutions ability to 
diversify through ring-fencing were the main tools. However, quite recently, several financial 
institutions expressed discontent with the recent regulation, because of their profits draining 
criteria. Hoeing (2018) documents a bill to the US Congress that permits banks to deduct cash 
held on behalf of clients from the calculation of Leverage. Doing so would lower the amount 
of capital the banks need as buffers and allow them to yield more cash to shareholders in the 
form of dividends and share buybacks. Such moves are expected to grow further in an attempt 
to repeal many of the 2012-2015 financial regulations.
The renewed debate on optimal bank structure floats two different 'diversification 
hypotheses':
H1 - Bank diversification allows banks to diversify risk and enable generating economies 
of scope and scale and increased efficiencies through cost-saving and revenue enhancements 
(Houston et al., 2001; Vennet, 2002; Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007) and
H2 - Bank diversification increases systemic risk (Berger et al., 2012) and decreases 
efficiency and creates negative economies of scope (Laeven and Levine, 2007; Stiroh and 
Rumble, 2006; Gambacorta and Rixtel, 2013). 
Therefore, this study utilises the product/market development matrix (Ansoff, 1980) to 
examine the diversification theory of financial institutions, on the relative merits of how the 
strategic orientation of mergers impacts bidders shareholders value, annual performance and 
firms’ economic value.
The contribution of this study feeds into the strand of diversification versus focus or 'ring-
fencing' scholarly and policy debate. That is, by identifying what types of activities/products 
are more likely to create shareholder value for financial institutions, and banks at their forefront. 
We examine how financial institutions have diversified or focused their activities and 
geographical presence, and the impact of each orientation on bidders shareholders' value and 
year-end performance. This study provides an improvement over current finance literature 
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because it deploys two different strategies in the analysis. At a univariate level, we examine the 
shareholder value creation and market reaction to merger announcements over the short and 
long horizons of the event. Followed by regressing the resultant Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CARs) and Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) over financial performance variables 
at the multivariate level. Namely, the methodology of the event study is used to calculate 
abnormal returns (CARs and BHARs), and the observed performance strategy that monitors 
FIs financial ratios from two years before the merger to two years after.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows; section 2 provides the literature review and the 
motivation of the study, section 3 outlines the methodological approach and data, section 4 
analyses results and section 5 concludes.
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2. Financial Institutions mergers: a literature review
Rhoades (1994) argues that event studies in that same period yield mixed results. 
Generally, there are positive abnormal returns to targets and negative or no abnormal returns 
for bidders upon the announcement of an M&A deal; regardless of the geographic and 
chronologic spans of these studies. Consistently, Kwan and Laderman (1999), surveying the 
US bank consolidation studies published between 1974 and 1998, find similarly mixed results. 
Their analysis focuses on the effects of expanding banking powers to include securities and 
insurance activities in addition to banks engaging in real estate activities. Kwan and Laderman 
(1999) conclude that although bank diversification into securities and insurance activities is 
more profitable and provides diversification benefits, it is riskier to the portfolio of banks.
Amel et al. (2004) present a summary of studies conducted between 1990 and 2001 on 
commercial banking vis-à-vis universal banking and financial conglomeration. They conclude 
that commercial bank M&As do not, on average, generate significant shareholder value, and it 
does not improve cost and profit efficiencies. Amel et al. (2004) suggest that there is no clear 
evidence on how shareholder value adjusts in response to M&As. This result supports the 
argument presented by DeYoung et al. (2009), in their review of a financial institution (FI) 
M&As in the post-2000 literature; suggesting that, there are not enough studies that examined 
the performance of universal banking and financial institutions’ conglomeration attempts 
rigorously, before and after mergers.
Hence, there exists a theoretical inconclusiveness on the financial institution structure 
that can provide adequate and sustainable wealth maximisation; the diversified, the universal 
and conglomerate, or the focused structure. This ambiguity also stems from the empirical 
evidence on how markets react to different types of bank M&As, especially when stability is 
seen through wealth maximisation improved profitability. 
Beitel et al. (2004), conclude that stock markets prefer focused M&A transactions over 
diversified ones in Europe. Target shareholders receive higher returns when the deal is more 
diversifying, while bidders are more successful in the activity focused, and geographically 
focused transactions. Targets seem to create more value in cross-border transactions. Expected 
performance following an FI merger play a vital role too; risk reduction potential through 
diversification, profit and cost efficiencies (cost-to-asset-ratio, returns on assets and equities). 
DeLong (2001b) examines the differential in stock market reactions to U.S. bank diversification 
and focus announcements. Results emphasise on the positive response of stock markets towards 
deals that tend to focus, both activity and geography, while the other types of M&As do not 
create value. Williams and Liao (2008) and Bellotti and Williams (2008) examine emerging 
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markets cross-border bank M&A deals that took place between 1998 and 2005. They find value 
creation and significant abnormal returns pattern for target banks, value destruction for bidder 
banks, but not if the activity is focused. These results contradict with Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
(2000) who investigate market reaction to European FIs M&A took place between 1988 and 
1997. They show that European financial market positively appreciates bank consolidations 
that aim at focusing activities and those that diversify towards insurance activities only. The 
combined performance of both bidders and targets is statistically significant for those deals. 
However, bank diversification towards securities firms or foreign institutions results in zero or 
negative returns for bidders, and narrow positive with lower significance for targets. DeLong 
(2001a) and (2003) confirm these results are valid in U.S. bank mergers during 1991 – 1995 
period. Their results support the assumption that markets reward mergers that focus their 
geography and activity and can enhance the long-term performance of banks and financial 
institutions. 
Amihud et al. (2002) and Beitel et al. (2004) examine European financial markets 
mergers. They report that the effects of cross-border mergers on returns of acquiring banks are 
significantly negative. Beitel et al. (2004) propose that activity focus and geographic focus 
significantly drive M&As and that high diversification impacts negatively the value creation 
for the bidding FIs. They argue that, from a combined point of view, the diversification 
hypothesis cannot be supported for European bidding banks and that non-diversifying 
transactions significantly create more value than diversifying transactions. Campa and 
Hernando (2006) diverge significantly from these results. Their analysis of 244 bank merger 
deals in the European countries (EU15) reports having lower excess returns for targets when 
the target is cross-border. This outcome contradicts with Lepetit et al. (2004), who confirms 
the existence of a positive and significant increase in value for target banks among all deals. 
However, they find positive and significant market reaction exists in cross-product 
diversification and geographic specialisation but not activity-focus deals. 
In the USA financial market, Fields et al. (2007) report positive and significant abnormal 
returns for banks bidding for a bancassurance merger. This positivity further extends to finding 
low risk transmitted from insurance targets to bidding banks. Results coincide with the 
international evidence provided by Dontis-Charitos et al. (2011) International evidence. 
Dontis-Charitos et al. (2011) argue that bank-insurance ventures sharing the same language 
tend to reap positive excess because they interrelate via similar cultural, trade practices, 
business ethics and legal backgrounds. This analogy is consistent with Ekkayokkaya et al. 
(2009) conclude that diversifying deals are value-enhancing and remain unaffected by the 
introduction of the Euro currency, while focused bids generated losses in the post-euro 
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introduction phase. Chen and Tan (2011) confirm the same for the European market, FIs 
mergers. Positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are observed for bidders, and two 
factors contributed to this; relative deal size and being a serial acquirer.
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3. Data and Methodology
 We deploy a descriptive, correlation and quasi-experimental research design. This 
approach enables the construction of a panel of immediate and medium-term variables of 
impact and performance. This approach contributes to identifying the market-product 
developing strategy that creates the best value for shareholders and for merging firms. The 
market-product development strategies are scaled over the Ansoff’s (1980) matrix of:
a) Market Penetration where an FI merges with an FI that conducts the same business 
in the same jurisdiction,
b) Market Development, where an FI merges with another FI that conducts the same 
business in a different jurisdiction,
c) Product Development where an FI merges with another FI that conducts a different 
portfolio in the same jurisdiction,
d) Diversification, (or conglomeration in FIs terminology) where an FI merges with 
another FI that conducts a different portfolio in a different jurisdiction.
3.1 Data 
The dataset comprises publicly traded financial institutions mergers and acquisitions that 
took place between 1992 and 2018. Where the merger leads the acquiring FIs to increase their 
existing ownership in the Target FIs from the range of 0% - 20% targeting the 51 - 100% range. 
A significant advancement over the current literature is in assessing mergers, not only for bank 
bidders but also for the three pillars institutions of the financial sector. Therefore, we examine 
mergers where bidders and targets are a financial institution that acquired another financial 
institution (Insurance, Real Estate or Investment companies).  These criteria make it the most 
comprehensive data set and most accommodating among studies that explored the impact of 
bank M&As on shareholders’ and firms’ values simultaneously.
=======Table I =========
Stock prices of FIs institutions are procured from Bloomberg using Bloomberg Industry 
Classification Systems (BICS) Ticker code of FIs that took part and completed an M&A deal. 
Deal size is set to be greater than or equal to $U.S. 100 Million, because smaller transactions 
are usually done by specialised boutique firms, where ambiguity of payment and reporting 
methods increases (Beitel and Schiereck, 2001), and  deals that are over 100 million dollars are 
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likely to have high 'institutional presence' in deal commissioning and negotiation (John et al., 
2014). The following tables provide a summary of the total number of deals and respective total 
values and deals distribution of the sample over the selection criteria.
========Table II ======
3.2 Methodology
This study examines financial institutions merger effect on bidders’ shareholder's value 
and their observed performance. This examination deploys three techniques simultaneously; an 
event study analysis, a Buy and Hold event study analysis and observed performance analysis. 
Deal Criteria, strategic orientation (as in Ansoff (1980) growth strategies), acquiring bank size, 
and payment method are set individually as control variables. 
3.2.1 Event Study; Market Perception
Following Dolley (1933) and Ball and Brown (1968)1, we utilise the event study 
methodology to FIs wealth maximisation through shareholders value by measuring firms 
abnormal returns (AR). ARs are the deviation of actual stock returns from expected stock 
returns, as a result of an event, to account for the impact of this event on firms' stock prices. 
These ARs represents the magnitude of shareholders value maximisation (positive or negative) 
created following the event. Under the “agency problem” theory and the “hubris hypothesis”, 
an intended M&A does not necessarily imply that the management aims to maximise 
shareholders wealth. In the context of this study, the event is the merger or acquisition 
announcements of financial institutions that took place between 1993 and 2018, and that are 
above $US 100 million in deal value.  states that markets are not affected by banks’ M&A 𝐇𝟎
announcements. Alternative hypothesis , testifies that markets are affected by banks M&A 𝐇𝟏
announcements, and enables measuring the magnitude of this effect to differentiate how various 
bidding and target FIs shares react towards various deals types of focusing and diversifying 
activities and/or geography.  
1 Brown and Warner (1985) worked on making event study methodology more statistically valid through enhancing 
the rigor of models used and its significance testing (focusing on performance problems in monthly data and daily data 
separately that are also enhanced through Kothari and Warner (2007) by resolving methodology issues of events 
clustering, abnormal returns aggregation and variances changing.
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Therefore, abnormal returns  for institution   at time t are the difference between its 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑖
actual returns  and its expected returns  estimated using the market model that 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
regresses (OLS) returns in the estimation window over the market M returns ;𝑅𝑀,𝑡 
𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕 =  𝑹𝒊,𝒕 ―  𝑬(𝑹𝒊,𝒕)  (𝟏)
Where
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 =  𝜶𝒊, 𝒕 +  𝛃𝒊𝑹𝒎,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊, 𝒕  (𝟐)
Hence, 
𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕 =  𝑹𝒊,𝒕 ―  𝜶 ―  𝜷𝑹𝒎,𝒕 (𝟑)
Then aggregate ARs to find cumulative abnormal returns CAR to check for their 
magnitude and significance accept or reject the . 𝐇𝟎
In this study, the analysis is based on an estimation period of 200 trading days (-241 to -
41) before the event announcement(s) (t = 0), leaving an 81-day (-40, + 40) window for the 
event study period. Average abnormal returns are then aggregated for each day in the event 
window using equation (4). This formula aggregates the abnormal returns for the N number of 
stocks to find the average abnormal return at time t for every stock .𝑖
𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕 =  ∑𝑵𝒊 = 𝟏𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕𝑵          (𝟒)
Another aggregation takes place for average abnormal returns over the t days in the event 
windows T to form the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) equation (5).
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇 =  𝑇∑
𝑡 = 1𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡        (5)
Expanding over the current literature is the utilisation Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHAR) to examine the merger impact on acquirers returns over the longer run. The Buy and 
Hold methodology employs geometric returns, rather than arithmetic returns in calculating the 
overall return over the event period of interest, allowing for compounding, whereas the CAR 
does not (Brooks, 2013). BHARs are the difference between the realised buy-and-hold return 
and the normal buy-and-hold return;
𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹𝒊(𝑻𝟏,𝑻𝟐) =  ∏𝑻𝟐
𝒕 = 𝑻𝟏(𝟏 + 𝑹𝒊,𝒕) ―  ∏𝑻𝟐𝒕 = 𝑻𝟏𝟏 + 𝑬[𝑹𝒊,𝒕]    (𝟔)
And mean Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns would be 
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𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1,𝑇2) = ∑𝑁𝑖 = 1𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1,𝑇2)𝑁        (7)
The t-test is applied, in time series and cross-sectionally, to test for the statistical 
significance of the ARs using the following equation; where   are time references for 𝑡1 and 𝑡2
the days of the window and  is the number of days in this window.Count (𝑡1,𝑡2)t ― stat = CAR[𝑡1,𝑡2](1/𝑁2∑𝑁𝑖 = 1𝜎2𝑖 )   (8)
To handle any potential cases of normality in the distribution of ARs posed by event date 
clustering (Rezitis, 2008; Hernando et al., 2009; Knapp et al., 2006), the BMP Boehmer et al. 
(1991) test is applied. 
𝐵𝑀𝑃 = SCAR𝑡1,𝑡21
𝑁2∑𝑛𝑖 = 1(SCAR𝑡1,𝑡2 ―  (SCAR𝑡1,𝑡2)2 (9)
Where the standardised CAR is , and  is estimated by the market SCARt1,t2 =  CARt1,t2𝜎𝑖𝑡t1,t2 𝜎𝑖𝑡
model as ( − +1)· . Furthermore, nonparametric tests of Corrado (1989) and sign tests are 𝑡2 𝑡1 𝜎2𝑒𝑖
also employed. These tests have the advantage that; they do not consider the abnormal returns 
distribution. Using ranks neutralises the statistical effect (such as outliers, skewness etc.) of 
abnormal returns. Assuming that  is the rank for bank i at time t and T is the number of 𝑲𝒊𝒕
observations for the estimation and event period, the average expected rank for bank i is 𝑲𝒊
. Hence, Corrado (1989) test C would be;= 𝟎.𝟓 + 𝑻𝒊/𝟐
𝐶 = 1𝑁∑𝑁𝑖 = 1(𝐾𝑖0 ― 𝐾𝑖)1
𝑇
∑𝑇
𝑡 = 1 1𝑁2∑𝑁𝑖 = 1(𝐾𝑖0 ― 𝐾𝑖)2 
1
𝐿    (10)
Furthermore, the significance test is conducted via the Generalised Sign (GS) Test 
proposed initially by Cowan (1992). It is based on the ratio of positive cumulative abnormal 
returns  over the event window. Under the null hypothesis, this ratio should not 𝑃 +0
systematically deviate from the ratio of positive cumulative abnormal returns over the 
estimation window . Since the ratio of positive cumulative abnormal returns is a binominal 𝑃 +𝐸𝑠𝑡.
random variable, the GS test statistics would be:
𝑡𝐺𝑆 = 𝑃 +0 ― 𝑃 +𝐸𝑠𝑡.𝑃 +𝐸𝑠𝑡.(1 ― 𝑃 +𝐸𝑠𝑡.)/𝑁   (11)
Page 10 of 46Journal of Financial Economic Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Econom
ic Policy
11
Since Buy and Hold abnormal returns are often positively skewed (Barber and Lyon, 
1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997), a skewness-adjusted t-test, developed by (Johnson, 1978) is 
applied;
𝑻𝑺𝒌𝒆𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 ― 𝑨𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 = 𝑵[𝑺 + 𝟏𝟑𝜸𝑺𝟐 + 𝟏𝟔𝑵𝜸]  (𝟏𝟐)
where  and .𝑆 = 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1,𝑇2)𝜎𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 𝛾 = ∑𝑁𝑖 = 1[𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1,𝑇2) ― 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1,𝑇2)]^2𝑁𝜎3𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅
3.2.2 Observed Performance 
In an approach of “strategic performance” similar to the one adopted by Chatterjee et al. 
(1992), Ramaswamy (1997) and Altunbas and Ibanez (2008), we examine strategic variables 
of financial institutions and their changes from pre-merger to post-merger. The model links 
performance adjustment pre- and post-merger to a strategic indicator and a set of control 
variables that are likely to influence performance. Therefore, the concepts of strategic choices 
of market and/or product development (Ansoff, 1980) assume that the major aspects of FIs 
strategic orientation can be seen in the resources allocation decisions that managements make. 
In particular, we examine the strategic features of FIs engaged in a merger with another FI that 
pursuit Investment, Insurance, Commercial banking or real estate (property) as lines of 
business. Balance sheet, income statement and cash flow items are downloaded, using FIs 
tickers, from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Ratios of profitability, liquidity, credit risk, capital 
structure and efficiency and outputs of loans are then calculated for two and one year before 
the merger announcement, the year-end of merger announcement, and one and two years after 
merger announcement and completion.
The value creation of bank mergers is also examined through analysing Economic Value 
Addition (EVA), which is a measure of a company's financial performance based on the 
residual wealth calculated by deducting its cost of capital from its operating pr fit and adjusted 
for taxes on a cash basis. EVA can also be referred to as economic profit, as it attempts to 
capture the true economic profit of a company. This measure was devised by management 
consulting firm Stern Value Management, originally incorporated as Stern Stewart and Co and 
published in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (Stern et al., 1995). EVA measures the 
wealth an FIs creates (or destroys) each year. It is a company’s after-tax profit from operations 
minus a charge for the cost of all capital employed to produce those profits – not just the cost 
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of debt, but the cost of equity as well. EVA is the incremental difference in the rate of return 
over a company's cost of capital. Essentially, it is used to measure the value a FI and banks 
generates from funds invested into it (Chen and Dodd, 1997; Kan and Ohno, 2012). This also 
contributes to examining if financial firms are “shareholder value-efficient” (Fiordelisi, 2007). 
If EVA is negative, it means the company is not generating value from the funds invested into 
the business. Conversely, a positive EVA shows an FI is producing value from the funds 
invested in it. Hence,
  𝑬𝑽𝑨𝒕 ― 𝟏,𝒕 = 𝑵𝑶𝑷𝑨𝑻𝒕 ― 𝟏,𝒕 ― (𝑰𝑪𝒕 ― 𝟏,𝒕 ∗ 𝑲𝒆𝒕 ― 𝟏,𝒕)   (13)
Where;
NOPAT is the Net Operating Profits (Income) after Tax, IC=Invested Capital and  𝐾𝑒𝑡 ― 1,𝑡
is the estimated cost of capital (See Appendix A for details). 
Hence, the success of merger deals could be seen through other determinants that have 
well performed in several time terms after the deal. For instance, performance is examined 20 
and 40 days after announcement through CAR, at year-end for the whole financial year 
performance, by comparison of post and pre-event year-end measures, sustainability growth 
rate and economic value addition.  Table III below shows these variables and their specific 
codes.
Abnormal returns and observed performance are then panelled over regional and 
jurisdictional constructs to be Robustly regressed. Robust regression helps avoid the 
inefficiency of least squares under fat-tailed non-normality and their significantly larger biases 
relative to robust regression coefficient estimators under bias inducing distributions of daily 
(fluctuating) calculated abnormal returns (Maravina, 2012; Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010; 
Hoechle, 2007). In addition to its advantage of allowing great flexibility in modelling 
differences in behaviour across individual cases and events. Hence, the robust regression model 
would be based on;
𝑨𝒃𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕 = 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒄 𝑶𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏′𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆′𝒊𝒕𝜶 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕
where the performance vector includes EVA, and
 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒕 = 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒄 𝑶𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏′𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆′𝒊𝒕𝜶 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕
where Performance vector excludes EVA but includes CAR and CBHAR.
======Table III=======
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4. Results
The data set covers 1485 Financial Institution mergers. Table IV below shows financial 
accounting data aggregated for all the 1,485 acquiring financial institutions. Panel A shows 
mean, median and standard deviation, while panel B shows the change of these variables 
between the year of the merger and the following one year and two years, and between one-
year post-merger and one-year pre-merger. Over 64% of FIs mergers are completed within the 
same year of the announcement, and around 35% are completed the following year. Hence 
presenting the change in financial performance between the year before the announcement and 
the years of announcement/completion (Year0 &Year+1).
======Table IV====
Financial and accounting measures adjustments show, on average, improvements for 
acquiring FIs in the year of announcement. Except for the economic value addition, which are 
negatives with large standard deviation. Suggesting further examination of how different 
mergers types ad FIs create value through mergers. As over 99% of deals are completed in the 
same year of announcement or the following year, Panel B provides a more realistic summary 
of financial performance. The comparison between the year before the merger announcement 
and the year of announcement (completion for 65% of deals) shows; positive return on equity, 
enhanced liquidity, and EVA. This proves the positive impact of mergers on FIs returns on 
equity and on invested capital, leading to creating economic value (adding). However, negative 
cost to income ratio reflecting cost deficiencies or income deterioration. Other expenses to total 
assets exhibit increase, however, not necessarily reflect an increase in expenses rather the 
decrease in total assets as a signal of fixed assets disposal due to consolidations. Panel D shows 
that all financial variables exhibit positive change a year after the merger, except for EVA, 
which returned to the negative position maintained in the year of the announcement. All the 
improvements are more stable (lower variations-st.dev.) with higher medians. This suggests 
further examination of the “Shareholder value efficiency” (Fiordelisi, 2007), hence the next 
stage of investigation examines shareholders value at various time spans and in regression over 
financial/accounting indices.
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4.1 Shareholders value and FIs mergers
Two years following the merger completion (35% announcement), bidders exhibit 
improvement in liquidity status and continued positive capital structure. However, bidding FIs 
appear to have deteriorated returns on equity, the cost to income ratio and by large economic 
value and total assets. Mainly reflecting, lower drive, or failure, to create value or enhance 
efficiencies after two years from merger. It remains imperative to differentiate over the control 
variables associated with financial institutions mergers and acquisitions; focus vs. 
diversification, deal value, regions and jurisdictions and payment types.
Table V provides an analysis of how financial/accounting performance variables changes 
in response to FIs merger announcements over deal types; Diversification, Market 
Development, Market penetration and product development.
 
====Table V====
Results show that market development through cross-border or cross-state deals provides 
the highest return on equity in the same year of the merger, 31.5%, followed by diversification 
at 15.93%. Market penetration and product development have brought FIs negative return on 
equity with -0.798% and -10.388% respectively. However, in the year following the merger, 
diversification continued to provide a positive return on equity while market development 
turned to negative ROE (1.823% & -1.235%). Product development proved to be more 
profitable in the longer run than in the short run and market development and market 
penetration (8.251% & -0.7549%). Return on Invested capital follows a similar paradigm. 
Liquidity and cost to income ratio support market penetration and not any of the geographic 
diversification options. Market penetration proves to be cost-efficient, even a year on the 
merger.
Although the cost of capital appears with little variation among merger strategies, product 
development and market penetration deals can decrease capital cost faster than diversification 
and market development deals. Examining ROE and ROIC along with liquidity changes against 
the weighted average of cost of capital (WACC) remits to theorises that; diversification and 
market development deals expand geographically and can provide higher return but at a cost 
that is high and long-standing in debts and balance sheets. Economic value addition exhibit 
positive mean only for diversifying deals. However, comparing the change in from before 
merger to the year of the merger, EVA shows the highest deterioration in EVA for diversifying 
deals. Market development also exhibits negative EVA in year-1 to year0 change. A year on 
the merger provides different mapping; diversification provides the highest EVA (28,226.97) 
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followed market penetration (6,987.05). Market development mergers also improve EVA 
position a year on the merger, although remains negative. Product development appears to 
enhance economic value in the short run but destroys economic value a year after the merger. 
Hence, diversification (new products and new markets) and market penetration (existing 
products in existing markets) provide the most sustainable economic value addition, lower cost 
of capital and higher cost efficiency. Mitigating the time needed for mergers to realise potential 
returns and payback in scale and costs efficiencies.  
Table VI below shows CARs, along with their significance testing and probabilities, 
segregated over deal types of product and geographic orientations. While table VII shows 
BHARs and their significance over the same deal types.
=====Table VI====
Overall, FIs mergers destroy value for the bidding firms. CARs are all significant when 
tested over parametric and non-parametric significance tests, including the ones adjusting for 
normality of distribution. Market penetration mergers exhibit similar results. Diversification 
strategies do not appear to have a significant influence on acquiring FIs shareholders value in 
the short horizon of the merger. However, results for market and product development appear 
not significant overall, they do exhibit positive CARs, and significant in the windows of (0, 0) 
and (-1, +3) respectively. This reaction is a realisation f the anticipated synergy from different 
types of deals and their values. 
 Table VII shows the long horizon event study results and the Buy and Hold abnormal 
returns, also segregated over the various strategies that describe the FIs mergers. Results show 
overall positive and significant value creation in 50 and 80 trading days, following the merger 
announcement. Market development mergers exhibit positive and significant BHARs 50 days 
on merger announcement. Lowering the confidence threshold from 95% to 90% increases the 
number of long-horizon windows and categories that show a significant reaction in BHAR to 
the merger announcement. 
======Table VII======
Therefore, bidding FIs destroy shareholders value in the immediate effect of mergers 
announcement with clear evidence from focused FIs mergers. However, in the longer run, 
product development mergers are more consistently value-creating than other consolidation 
strategies. Although diversification helps to diversify risk and sources of income, it could be 
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seeking a too-big-to-fail status (Elsas et al., 2010), and involves much higher risks 
(environmental, cultural and legal) (Berger et al., 2013). This outcome justifies the positive 
perception in the short horizon event study but negative in the long run. Markets applaud 
Product development. Positive and significant abnormal returns in both short and long horizons. 
A result that reflects the high potential to enhance productivity, and benefit from economies of 
scale and strategic similarities. In addition to the economies of scope and efficiencies 
enhancement when combined with positive BHARs of market development and market 
penetration. Results contradict with the literature that elaborates on the lack of technical 
efficiencies (Laeven and Levine, 2007), and the opaqueness and brand identity loss and agency 
problems (Elyasiani and Wang, 2012) due to such mergers.
 When segregating the data set over deal criteria, several exciting results surface. 
Megadeals, with a value of US$10 Billion, appear to preserve more value for bidding FIs 
shareholders than those involved in a non-mega deal. Table VIII below shows that, although 
they both exhibit negative CARs in the prompt windows of (0, 0), (-1, +1, +3 &+5) days, mega 
deals bidders exhibit 10 folds more value creation. However insignificant, BHARs are all 
positive for bidding FIs. Nevertheless, mega deals can generate ten more folds abnormal returns 
in the long run than non-mega deals. Reflecting shareholders appreciation of the general 
capability of large deals to capitalise upon the actual size and reputation and geographical 
coverage of bidders and targets to enhance efficiency and drive profit and value. As a result of 
larger diversification benefits, stronger capital positions in addition to projected cuts to 
operating costs and costs of capital (Carow and Kane, 2002; Houston et al., 2001; Kane, 2000).
======Table VIII====
Financial institutions mergers that are paid by $US currency create significantly more 
value for bidders, in the short horizon than the ones paid for in Euro and British Pound. Deals 
paid by other currencies (local currencies) tend to create value upon merger announcement 
when the rest of deals destroy value (windows (0, 0) and (-1, +1)). Table IX also shows that 
payment in bidders local currencies have a long-lasting value effect with BHARs being positive 
and significant until 230 days after the deal announcement. 
====Table IX====
Payment type (method) also show a significant association with shareholders value effect 
of FIs mergers. Table X shows little to non-significant adjustment in shareholders’ value when 
the deal is paid for by “Stock and Debt”, “Cash, Stock and Debt” and when the payment type 
is “Undisclosed”. However, when the deal is paid for using “Cash” the short and long-horizon 
effect is significant and positive, from announcement windows to +200 and +230 days 
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windows. Evidencing a clear preference of shareholders to this type of deals, because cash 
payments for such large transactions reflect the bidder’s adequacy and liquidity, which enables 
FIs to face any future challenges, resulting from or not resulting from the decision of the 
merger. Furthermore, the literature suggests that “cash” in itself as a medium of payment for 
merger deals is interpreted as good news, opposite to when it is “stock” (Franks et al., 1991; 
Travlos, 1987). 
When the merger is paid by “Stock” or “Cash or Stock” shareholders value resembles the 
mainstream reaction known from bidders’ shareholders in FIs mergers, negative small 
magnitude CAR. However, deals with these types of payments sustain negative shareholders 
value to the long horizon too with negative insignificant BHARs. 
The 2007-2011 financial crisis seems to have influenced shareholders values of bidding 
FIs in M&As. Deals that took place before the crisis confirm the literature of negative ARs in 
short horizons and positive ARs in long horizons. The crisis appears to have a long-lasting 
negative effect on shareholders’ value. BHARs during the financial crisis were consistently 
negative and 4 to 7 times more in magnitude compared to the same windows before the crisis. 
Table XI also shows shareholders value has improved in response to FIs mergers from the 
beginning of 2012. ARs in the short horizons are either positive or negative, but 3 to 5 folds 
less compared to ARs during the crisis. Moreover, abnormal returns in the long horizon turned 
to become all positive with significant 2 to 4 folds greater than before the crisis.
=====Table XI====
 Figure 1 shows the timeline of financial performance variables means; during before, 
during and after the financial crisis. Towards the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008, there was 
a sharp decline in bidders FIs liquidity, ROE, and economic value. Credit risk has also 
culminated during this period but dipped in 2009; reflecting the lessened credit activities 
expected from banks due to the crisis. 
=====Figure 1=====
Notably, returns on invested capitals during the 2007-2011 crisis were not much affected, 
and in harmony with credit risk and liquidity increase in 2007. An outcome that shows how 
bailout policies are enforced to keep the financial sector afloat through capital injections in 
defaulted banks (Kaufman, 2014; Dunn et al., 2015). Distinctly, 2002 witnessed heightened 
liquidity, credit risk and return on invested capital but lower returns on equity; a representation 
of FIs policies in the wake of the dotcom bubble; through savings on operational costs and 
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utilising the available funds (liquidity) in issuing loans (Petersen and Wiegelmann, 2014; 
Andriosopoulos and Yang, 2015). 
    
4.1.1 Mergers strategies and performance (nominal and operating)
Dissecting broader strategies into the industries of targets enable further insights. Tables 
XII, XIII summarise the association of the shareholders’ value effect in several groups of 
focused and diversified mergers, with financial performance in the year of the merger 
announcement (65% Completion) and the following year (98.9% completion). Table XIV 
shows how meregers strategies influence operating performance, materialised in cost to income 
ratio, cost of capital and net operating profit. Overall, the focused deals of bank-bank, real 
estate-real estate and insurance-insurance exhibit higher significance of the association between 
value creation and post-merger financial performance. 
========Table XII========
In the announcement year, local bank to bank mergers create shareholders value and 
increases their liquidity and economic value in the short run. Furthermore, these deals enable 
bidding banks to increase returns (ROE) from lending (Loans to Deposits) and decrease credit 
risk along with the long-run share value increase. However, this is at the cost of deteriorating 
return on invested capital, liquidity and economic value. Symmetrical performance association 
is witnessed in the year following the merger announcement year (Table XIII). When banks 
merge or acquire another bank in a different jurisdiction (Country or state), shareholder value 
creation is more drifted towards the announcement year-end (+230 days).
Furthermore, value creation in the long horizon appears to be involving high costs (cost 
to income) and higher risks (Loans to deposits and credit risk). Results in the year following 
the merger deal are also similar. It is most probably due to costs of cultural (Language, brand, 
legal) and procedural (regulations and regulators, organisational culture) differences leading to 
diminishing value; faster than local deals and incurring more costs to adapt and implement 
consolidations following the merger. 
========Table XIII====
Real estate bidders that merge with another real estate firm across the border (or state) 
create shareholders value and gain return on equity and economic value, although at the cost of 
higher expenses in the long run. However, focused real estate mergers appear to be more 
successful. They create shareholders value in the short horizon, and this value is accompanied 
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by enhanced liquidity, decreased expenses and economic value addition. However, costs to 
income and credit risk appear to become higher. As real estate firms are not lending firms, the 
increase in credit risk reflects the debts through loans that real estate companies often operate 
with to finance operations (land acquisitions and developments). Insurance companies focused 
mergers can create value in the short horizon post-merger, only at the expense of lower liquidity 
and higher expenses.
Table XIV shows that all mergers that create shareholder value (short & long) are able 
to enhance their operational performance. Particularly, operating costs and capital costs. This 
is emphasised through the negative cost to income ratio. However, this cost saving does not 
appear to be sustainable, as it comes at the expense of deteriorating net operating profit after 
tax and economic gain (EVA). Panel B of same table proves variations exist pertaining to 
different strategies of mergers. Market penetration and diversification strategies support FIs 
cost to income reduction wh le product and market development do not. Essentially reflecting 
diversification of income sources benefits. Nevertheless, these benefits are short-run because 
opposite associations prevail when examining economic value (and its NOPAT) and cost of 
capital.
=====Table XIV====
4.1.2 Shareholders value and economic value
Economic value addition captures the true actual economic profit of a firm. Furthermore, 
due to EVA’s methodological importance in providing the net effect of business profits, we 
examine EVA in the post-merger year along with merger year abnormal returns and other 
financial variables. This tactic enables us to test for “shareholders value efficiency” following 
Fiordelisi (2007) by examining EVA change from year0 (merger) to year1 (post-merger) 
relative to return on invested capital.
Table XIV (Panel A) shows that in banks-banks mergers economic value post-merger is 
driven largely by an expansion in loans (Loans to T. Assets ratio) in North American and 
Australasian bidding banks. Shareholders value also drives long-run economic value for North 
American bank bidders. EVA is also negatively influenced by the large base of loans compared 
to deposits, hence credit risk, and low net loans to assets in Australasian bank focused mergers.
========Table XIV=======
Long run shareholders value, along with liquidity lower costs higher capital ratio and 
lower risks in the merger year, helps Latin American bank bidders gain economic value post-
merger. For European bank mergers, the evidence is relatively mixed. Long-horizon 
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shareholders value contributes to generating economic value for cross border bank mergers 
despite high capital to assets ratio and low return on equity. Cross border bank mergers in 
Europe allow banks to decrease credit risk significantly and increase return on invested capital 
along with improving economic value. Particularly because diversity in bank loans enables 
betterment in credit risk strategy (Altunbas and Ibanez, 2008; Hagendorff et al., 2012). 
However, examining the “shareholder value efficiency” theory shows that European bank-bank 
M&As decrease bidders shareholder value efficiency through negative returns on invested 
capital (Table XIV (Panel B)). 
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5. Conclusion
The financial sector has continuously experienced restructuring and reformation; either 
through re-regulation following crisis or deregulation following innovation. This synthetic 
cycle (Kane, 1981, 1977) can be alleviated when economic and political powers find the 
optimal financial institution structure that can sustain a permanent and idiosyncratic risk-return 
enhanced status. One way of arriving at such status is through consolidations. This study 
contributes to the renewed policy debate, especially following the 2007-2011 crisis, by 
examining the value creation effect of financial institutions mergers and their determinants. 
Results encourage FIs to achieve growth through Market and Product Development 
strategies because they enable value creation for shareholders both in the short and the long 
run. Local similar FIs mergers destroy value for the bidding firms pursuing, and Diversification 
strategies do not appear to have a significant influence on acquiring FIs shareholders value both 
in the short and in the long run.  
Policymakers and regulators are advised to consider and permit, the regional and 
jurisdictional adaptations of regulations and the adoption of local assessment techniques. This 
conduct helps tackle regulatory arbitrage and promotes elasticity for growth and economic 
value creation strategies. 
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Table I Descriptive Statistics of the values distribution of Financial Institutions' mergers.
YEAR VALUE IN $US 
MIL.
NUMBER OF 
DEALS
REGION VALUE IN $US 
MIL.
NUMBER OF 
DEALS
1995 2008.35 1 North America 814763.23 553
1996 5218.69 4 Australasia 389439.44 333
1997 9754.37 2 Africa 8104.87 22
1998 208155.3 43 Europe 816281.88 517
1999 122661.52 61 Latin America 56171.65 60
2000 98842.01 61 Total 2084761.07 1485
2001 115484.31 81  
2002 49501.55 55  
2003 129959.35 88  
2004 129990.48 90  
2005 132377.57 90 Geographic Orientation Value in $US 
Mil.
Number of Deals
2006 223071.92 141 Intrastate US 206053.1 162
2007 172871.08 113 Cross-border 792906.83 741
2008 105032.38 64 Local 630031.17 351
2009 46797.24 49 Cross-State US 455769.97 231
2010 94645.46 64 Total 2084761.07 1485
2011 39764.96 37
2012 38010.28 46  
2013 44341.08 65  
2014 72453.88 88 Strategic Orientation Value in $US 
Mil.
Number of Deals
2015 107213.03 77 Market Penetration 1228786.97 697
2016 82627 82 Product Development 63067.27 47
2017 44963.22 74 Market Development 703280.43 601
2018 9016.04 9 Diversification 89626.4 140
TOTAL 2084761.07 1485  Total 2084761.07 1485
This table shows descriptive statistics of the data set sample. It shows distribution of number and 
monetary value of deals over years from 1995 to 2018 (no deals met the threshold of $usmil.100 
between 1992 and 1994). It also shows the distribution over the main regions of North America, 
Australia, Latin America, Europe and Africa. The geographic orientation panel differentiates 
between the US mergers and rest of the world mergers, and between intrastate and cross-state 
mergers in the us. Strategic orientation panel shows high popularity of market penetration and 
market development strategies of FIs mergers, over diversification.
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Table II Descriptive Statistics of the number of deals distribution of Financial Institutions' mergers.
PRODUCT ORIENTATION VALUE IN $US MIL. NUMBER OF 
DEALS
Banks-banks 1187129.79 657
Banks-insurance 27334.31 30
Banks-real estate 30957.28 54
Banks-investment company 2547.23 9
I surance-banks 31675.68 12
Insurance-insurance 489376.11 293
Insurance-real estate 10002.22 38
Insurance-investment company 10938.51 4
Investment company-banks 2660.87 3
Investment company-insurance 14009.31 5
Investment company-real estate 5234.86 8
Investment company-investment company 5641.76 10
Real estate-bank 0 0
Real estate-insurance 0 0
Real estate-real estate 249919.74 338
Real estate-investment company 17333.4 24
Total 2084761.07 1485
This table shows descriptive statistics showing the distribution of deal numbers and values of FIs 
mergers examined over the product/activity orientation of the acquirers and targets. Deals where a 
bank is the bidder totals 750 deals with 50% of the value of all deals. Adding deals where banks 
were another party of the deal would make total number of mergers with a bank in the deal above 
51% and more than 61% value.
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Table III Data and accounting Matrics; source platforms and ID codes.
Variables Labels ID-Codes Sources
ROE Return on Equity - Total (%) WC08301
DataStream - Thomson Reuters 
Profitability Ratio, Annual & 
Interim Item
Liquidity Liquid (Current) Assets / Total Deposits WC02201 / WC03019
DataStream - Thomson Reuter.  
Liquidity Ratio
Cost to Income Ratio Cost (Operating Expenses) / Revenue (Sales) WC01051 / WC01001
DataStream - Thomson Reuter - 
Efficiency Ratio
Capital to Total 
Assets Ratio Total Capital / Total Assets WC03998 / WC02999
DataStream - Thomson Reuter - 
Capital Ratio
Net Loans to Total 
Assets Net Loans / Total Assets WC02276 / WC02999
DataStream - Thomson Reuter -
Assets (Banks) – Liabilities 
(Other FIs) to total Assets
Credit Risk Loan loss provision/Net interest revenues WC01271 / WC01076
DataStream - Thomson Reuter - 
Credit Exposure
Loans to Deposits 
Ratio
Customer Loans / Customer 
Deposits WC02266 / WC03019
DataStream - Thomson Reuter - 
Assets to Liabilities, Income 
efficiency
Other Expenses to 
Total Assets Other Expenses / Total Assets WC03069 / WC02999
DataStream - Thomson Reuter - 
Non-operating expenses to total 
Assets
EVA Economic Value Addition
Calculate Net Operating Profit After Tax 
(NOPAT), Calculate Total Invested Capital 
(TC), Determine a Cost of Capital 
(WACC), Calculate EVA = NOPAT – 
WACC% * (TC)
Bloomberg - 
WACC_ECON_VALUE_ADD
ED
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital
Multiply the cost of each capital 
component by its proportional weight, take 
the sum of the results, Multiple by 1 - 
Corporate tax rate.
Bloomberg -WACC
ROIC Return on Invested Capital
Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) 
divided by Invested Capital which is 
calculated by subtracting cash and non-
interest bearing current liabilities 
(NIBCL) – including tax liabilities and 
accounts payable, as long as these are not 
subject to interest or fees – from total 
assets. 
Bloomberg - 
RETURN_ON_INV_CAPITAL
Shows accounting / financial and efficiency and capital performance variables; and their sources, codes, formulae of calculation. 
Below are further notes on the data availability and what some data mean to different types of financial institutions: Banks, 
Insurance companies, Investment companies and real estate firms. There also considerations of the variations of reporting 
standards in different jurisdictions and this has been adjusted for.
Notes:
CURRENT ASSETS - represents cash and other assets that are reasonably expected to be realized in cash, sold or consumed within one year or one operating cycle. 
Generally, it is the sum of cash and equivalents, receivables, inventories, prepaid expenses and other current assets. DEPOSITS - represent the value of money held by 
the bank or financial company on behalf of its customers. The item includes demand, savings, money market and certificates of deposit along with foreign office and 
deposit accounts. Excluded are securities sold under repurchase agreement. COST OF GOODS SOLD - If a breakdown of total operating cost of non-manufacturing 
companies is not available then it is treated as cost of goods sold. For Utilities and Service (Financials) Organizations, if there is no clear breakdown between cost of 
goods sold and Selling, General and Administrative Expenses, the total amount is updated to Cost of Goods Sold and noted that Selling General and Administrative 
Expenses are included. Service Organizations may refer to this as Cost of Services. REVENUES represent the total operating revenue of the company. TOTAL 
CAPITAL represents the total investment in the company. It is the sum of common equity, preferred stock, minority interest, long-term debt, non-equity reserves and 
deferred tax liability in untaxed reserves. For insurance companies’ policyholders' equity is also included.  TOTAL ASSETS represent the sum of total current assets, 
long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets. LOANS -represent the total 
amount of money loaned to customers after deducting reserves for loan losses. For Banks: It includes but is not restricted to: Lease Financing Total non-performing 
assets (field 02287) For Other Financial Companies: It includes but is not restricted to: Lease Financing Finance Receivables.  Provision for Loan Losses Expense: 
represents losses that the bank or the company expects to take as a result of uncollectable or troubled loans. NET INTEREST INCOME represents the difference between 
the total interest income and total interest expense of the bank. CONSUMER & INSTALLMENT LOANS represent loans made to consumers. It includes but is not 
restricted to: Auto loans Home improvement loans Credit cards Home equity loans. OTHER EXPENSES (ACCRUED) represent those accrued expenses not included 
in accrued payroll, interest payable, dividends payable or income taxes payable.
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Table IV Summary statistics of financial performance of acquiring financial institutions in the years 
surrounding merger announcement.
 Panel A Panel B Panel C
 Overall - Announcement Year Year-1 to Year0 Year-1 to year+1
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median
ROE 1485 16.05 87.28 11.99 4.84 126.61 -0.09 0.52 136.8 -0.97
Liquidity 710 7.33 105.1 0.0000 2.46 71.91 0.0000 1.64 56.5 0.0000
Cost Income Ratio 1417 4.88 73.81 0.0000 -0.42 18.51 0.0000 -1.75 48.37 0.0000
Capital Assets Ratio 1341 0.3000 0.2700 0.1800 0.01 0.09 0.0000 0.01 0.14 0.0100
Net Loans T. Assets 1399 2.46 24.18 0.4600 -3.96 146.81 0.0000 -3.96 139.97 0.0000
Credit Risk 709 0.1600 0.5000 0.1000 0.01 0.34 0.0000 -0.05 0.58 0.0000
Loan to Deposits 723 0.1700 0.5000 0.0900 0.02 0.45 0.0000 0.04 0.76 0.0000
Other Expenses to T. 
Assets
1374 34.68 462.74 0.0000 3.32 153.28 0.0000 -5.98 192.68 0.0000
T. Assets 1485 2.30E+09 1.60E+10 4.30E+07 2.00E+08 8.30E+09 4.10E+06 6.90E+08 5.80E+09 8.20E+06
EVA 1114 -8023.88 330000 -168.74 5582.36 500000 -18.53 -6834.71 370000 -49.43
WACC 1114 6.71 2.61 6.36 0.05 1.56 0.06 4.32 136.7 -0.14
ROIC 994 8.43 13.24 5.53 0.09 10.75 -0.21 -0.02 15.25 -0.31
  Panel D Panel E
 Year0 to Year+1 Year0 to Year+2
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median
ROE 1485 16.05 87.28 11.99 -9.09 77.69 -1.35
Liquidity 710 7.33 105.1 0.0000 1.15 30.06 0.0000
Cost Income Ratio 1417 4.88 73.81 0.0000 -2.07 44.81 0.0000
Capital Assets Ratio 1341 0.3000 0.2700 0.1800 0.01 0.09 0.0100
Net Loans T. Assets 1399 2.46 24.18 0.4600 -0.4 6.81 0.0000
Credit Risk 709 0.1600 0.5000 0.1000 -0.03 0.66 0.0000
Loan to Deposits 723 0.1700 0.5000 0.0900 0.01 0.13 0.0000
Other Expenses to T. 
Assets
1374 34.68 462.74 0.0000 -10.4 178.76 0.0000
T. Assets 1485 2.30E+09 1.60E+10 4.30E+07 6.30E+08 5.00E+09 5.00E+06
EVA 1114 -8023.88 330000 -168.74 -18000 390000 -36.46
WACC 1114 6.71 2.61 6.36 6.01 187.36 -0.05
ROIC 994 8.43 13.24 5.53 -1.9 11.48 -0.25
This table shows summary statistics of financial and accounting performance independent variable 
of acquiring financial institutions. Panel A summarises the variable for the overall sample for 
number of observations, mean, standard deviation and median. Panel B shows the change of these 
variables the year before the merger to the year of the merger. Panel C shows how these variables 
adjusted between one year before merger announcement and one year following merger 
announcement. Panel D shows these variables adjustments between the year of the announcement 
(Completion) and the following year.
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Table V Financial institutions’ performance and performance change following different types of mergers.
  ROE ROE Change Liquidity Liquidity Change Cost to 
Income 
Cost to Income Change
 Obs Year-1 to Year0 Year0 to Year+1 Year-1 to Year0 Year0 to Year+1 Year-1 to Year0 Year0 to Year+1
Diversification 140 12.99348 15.9313 1.823478 12.40909 -2.476257 -3.26129 5.980813 -0.5295595 -0.7697513
Market 
Development
601 12.94015 31.58397 -1.235294 2.933178 -1.181174 0.4473392 5.891161 -0.1574723 -0.5493128
Market 
Penetration
697 12.38531 -0.7980447 -0.7549162 23.94188 10.93816 -3.123584 22.41624 -3.926921 -7.071453
Product 
Development
47 0.7845452 -10.38818 8.251819 0 0 0 0.0307117 0.0009068 -0.0112243
 Capital to T. 
Assets
Capital to T. Assets Change Net Loans to T. Assets Net Loans to T. Assets Change Credit Risk Credit Risk Change
 Year-1 to Year0 Year0 to Year+1 Year-1 to Year0 Year0 to Year+1 Year-1 to Year0 Year0 to Year+1
Diversification 140 0.1944692 0.0135278 -0.0063857 0.6437709 0.0004525 -0.0012213 0.1631746 0.032157 0.0063976
Market 
Development
601 0.167199 0.0010722 0.0029344 0.6190049 -0.003193 0.003489 0.1805913 -0.0096945 -0.0589171
Market 
Penetration
697 0.1656038 0.001973 0.0043871 0.6238279 -0.0030908 -0.0001197 0.1458591 -0.0143707 -0.0047038
Product 
Development
47 0.1861649 0.0011631 -0.0089763 0.6537592 0.0130678 0.0028392 0.2085839 -0.0060349 -0.0082386
 Loans to Deposits Loans to Deposits Change Other Expenses to T. 
Assets
Other Expenses to T. Assets 
Change
T. Assets T. Assets Change
 Year-1 to Year0 Year0 to Year+1 Year-1 to Year0 Year0 to Year+1 TAssetsChng_1_
0
TAChng0_1
Diversification 140 0.1295917 -0.0056473 -0.0227621 24.01444 -7.247932 0.2334675 5.24E+09 1.29E+09 7.58E+08
Market 
Development
601 0.1902568 -0.0145497 -0.0012566 26.52525 -18.16074 -6.218525 5.72E+09 8.90E+08 4.27E+08
Market 
Penetration
697 0.1182201 -0.0004184 -0.0039087 28.6438 -3.373951 13.09076 4.67E+09 4.88E+08 4.82E+08
Product 
Development
47 0.1722986 -0.0038372 -0.0414931 0.0285203 -0.0081884 0.0212141 2.20E+08 1.64E+07 2.28E+07
 EVA EVA Change WACC WACC Change ROIC ROIC Change
 Year-1 to Year0 Year0 to Year+1 Year-1 to Year0 Year0 to Year+1 Year-1 to Year0 Year0 to Year+1
Diversification 140 7307.259 -27944.33 28226.97 5.951683 0.2134348 0.0434652 4.591244 -0.9431956 0.1658174
Market 
Development
601 -9175.638 -12968.55 -7186.142 6.436445 0.2948912 0.0246199 5.465717 -0.4488228 -0.0781875
Market 
Penetration
697 -4143.285 1448.484 6987.057 6.485306 0.0327341 -0.0444676 5.449878 -0.3767324 -0.0167318
Product 
Development
47 -458.4131 1666.657 -1701.174 6.000182 -0.0175091 -0.3904546 1.242955 -4.386773 3.315464
This table Shows financial institutions’ performance and performance change following different types of mergers. These types of mergers are 
categorised of the strategic orientation of based on Ansoff’s (1980) Matrix of Market – Product development. This means that FIs mergers will be 
diversification if the acquirer and target are structurally different and are in different jurisdictions. The same analogy follows for the rest of deals 
(see footnote on same page).
Page 30 of 46Journal of Financial Economic Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Economic Policy
Table VI Short horizon cumulative abnormal returns along with parametric and non-parametric significance tests.
 WINDOW
(DAYS)
CAAR T-TEST 
TIME 
SERIES
PROB. T-TEST 
CROSS 
SECTIONAL
PROB PATELL Z PROB. BOEHMER ET 
AL.
PROB. CORRADO 
RANK
PROB. SIGN 
TEST
PROB.
(0, 0) -0.0029 -
5.7172
0.0000 -3.2264 0.0013 -9.7470 0.0000 -4.6867 0.0000 -4.4647 0.0000 -2.8730 0.0041
(-1, +3) -0.0047 -
4.0741
0.0000 -3.1035 0.0019 -5.6615 0.0000 -3.8177 0.0001 -3.7174 0.0002 -2.2396 0.0251
Overall
(-1, +5) -0.0055 -
4.0331
0.0001 -3.3082 0.0009 -5.0859 0.0000 -3.6747 0.0002 -3.1432 0.0017 -2.3980 0.0165
(0, 0) 0.0018 1.1240 0.2610 1.0449 0.2961 1.8960 0.0580 1.4709 0.1413 0.9197 0.3577 0.5220 0.6017
(-1, +3) -0.0002 -
0.0597
0.9524 -0.0720 0.9426 1.0826 0.2790 1.1056 0.2689 0.5915 0.5542 1.3863 0.1657
Diversification
(-1, +5) 0.0016 0.3731 0.7091 0.5754 0.5650 0.9224 0.3563 1.1307 0.2582 0.5765 0.5642 1.2134 0.2250
(0, 0) 0.0012 0.2946 0.7683 0.2879 0.7734 0.8627 0.3883 0.6072 0.5437 0.3783 0.7052 -0.0280 0.9777
(-1, +3) 0.0126 1.3545 0.1756 0.9476 0.3434 1.9788 0.0478 1.0647 0.2870 0.1971 0.8438 0.2679 0.7888
Product
development
(-1, +5) 0.0073 0.6658 0.5055 0.5886 0.5561 1.8423 0.0654 0.9404 0.3470 0.1142 0.9090 0.2679 0.7888
(0, 0) -0.0003 -
0.3396
0.7342 -0.2515 0.8014 -2.5198 0.0117 -1.4391 0.1501 -0.2951 0.7679 -0.2477 0.8044
(-1, +3) 0.0000 0.0022 0.9982 0.0020 0.9984 -0.9780 0.3281 -0.7694 0.4416 -0.6249 0.5320 0.8310 0.4060
Market
development
(-1, +5) 0.0004 0.2054 0.8373 0.1899 0.8493 -0.3650 0.7151 -0.3003 0.7640 -0.0205 0.9836 0.3331 0.7390
(0, 0) -0.0065 -
8.7858
0.0000 -3.9622 0.0001 -12.9581 0.0000 -5.2941 0.0000 -6.0652 0.0000 -4.1856 0.0000
(-1, +3) -0.0108 -
6.5484
0.0000 -4.3300 0.0000 -8.3569 0.0000 -4.9846 0.0000 -4.6500 0.0000 -4.7245 0.0000
Market
Penetration
(-1, +5) -0.0128 -
6.6029
0.0000 -4.7118 0.0000 -7.9793 0.0000 -5.1932 0.0000 -4.3591 0.0000 -4.4165 0.0000
This Table shows the short horizon event study results; cumulative abnormal returns along with parametric and non-parametric significance tests. 
Overall, FIs mergers destroys value for the bidding firms. CARs are all significant when tested over parametric and non-parametric significance 
tests, including the ones adjusting for normality of distribution. Numbers in red mark the significance level of t-tests to their left at 95% confidence 
level. Decreasing the confidence level to 90% (prob in green) strengthen the position of positive cars in diversification and product developments 
deals for cars (0, 0) and (-1, +5).
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Table VII Long horizon cumulative abnormal returns along with parametric and non-parametric 
significance tests.
 Window (DAYS) BHAR Pos:Neg Prob. Skewness 
Adjusted
p- Value
CBHAR [-50, +50] 0.0135 704 : 734 0.0122 2.679 0.0074
CBHAR [-50, +80] 0.0126 692 : 746 0.0388 2.172 0.0299
CBHAR [-50, +110] 0.0112 692 : 746 0.0831 1.7885 0.0737
CBHAR [-50, +140] 0.0078 681 : 757 0.2548 1.1652 0.2439
CBHAR [-50, +200] 0.0104 684 : 754 0.2126 1.2858 0.1985
Overall
CBHAR [-50, +230] 0.0115 687 : 751 0.2052 1.3282 0.1841
CBHAR [-50, +50] 0.0093 310 : 366 0.2415 1.2032 0.2289
CBHAR [-50, +80] 0.0121 308 : 368 0.2019 1.3325 0.1827
CBHAR [-50, +110] 0.0108 306 : 370 0.3021 1.0727 0.2834
CBHAR [-50, +140] 0.012 315 : 361 0.2881 1.1033 0.2699
CBHAR [-50, +200] 0.0163 316 : 360 0.2415 1.231 0.2183
Market Penetration
CBHAR [-50, +230] 0.0217 329 : 347 0.1668 1.5008 0.1334
CBHAR [-50, +50] 0.0172 300 : 282 0.0473 2.2812 0.0225
CBHAR [-50, +80] 0.0137 287 : 295 0.1436 1.5858 0.1128
CBHAR [-50, +110] 0.0094 283 : 299 0.3085 1.048 0.2946
CBHAR [-50, +140] 0.0017 281 : 301 0.8604 0.1834 0.8545
CBHAR [-50, +200] 0.0065 290 : 292 0.5695 0.5839 0.5593
Market Development
CBHAR [-50, +230] 0.0032 281 : 301 0.7829 0.2842 0.7762
CBHAR [-50, +50] 0.0777 27:19 0.0279 2.6687 0.0076
CBHAR [-50, +80] 0.0486 29:17 0.1232 1.6436 0.1003
CBHAR [-50, +110] 0.0639 31:15 0.0424 2.2277 0.0259
CBHAR [-50, +140] 0.0651 25:21 0.0458 2.2504 0.0244
CBHAR [-50, +200] 0.0374 22:24 0.2971 1.1087 0.2675
Product Development
CBHAR [-50, +230] 0.0608 23:23 0.1064 1.7379 0.0822
CBHAR [-50, +50] -0.0037 67 : 67 0.7681 -0.2843 0.7762
CBHAR [-50, +80] -0.0019 68 : 66 0.8991 -0.1129 0.9101
CBHAR [-50, +110] 0.0028 72 : 62 0.8692 0.1761 0.8602
CBHAR [-50, +140] -0.0065 60 : 74 0.7092 -0.3664 0.7141
CBHAR [-50, +200] -0.0118 56 : 78 0.5813 -0.5268 0.5983
Diversification
CBHAR [-50, +230] -0.0209 54 : 80 0.3409 -0.9241 0.3555
This table shows the Shows the long horizon event study results and the buy and hold abnormal 
returns CBHARs segregated over the various strategies that describe the FIs mergers. Overall 
positive and significant value creation in 50, 80 and 110 trading days following the merger 
announcement. Market development mergers exhibit positive and significant BHARs 50 days on 
merger announcement. Red and green highlighted figures are t-tests probability at confidence 
levels of 95% and 90% respectively. 
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Table VIII Short and Long Horizon Abnormal returns and the effect of  Mega mergers.
 Mega Deals Non-Mega Deals
Window CAAR t-Test 
Time 
Series
Prob. CAAR t-Test 
Time Series
Prob.
(-40, +40) -0.011 -0.4651 0.6418 2.1181 450.0592 0.0000
(0, 0) -0.0207 -7.8637 0.0000 -
0.0024
-4.6161 0.0000
(-1, +1) -0.0202 -4.4185 0.0000 -
0.0031
-3.3683 0.0008
(-1, +3) -0.0223 -3.7801 0.0002 -
0.0042
-3.5592 0.0004
(-1, +5) -0.0229 -3.281 0.0010 -0.005 -3.5916 0.0003
 BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- 
Value
BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- 
Value
(-50, +230) 0.0058 0.1636 0.8701 0.0117 1.3175 0.1877
(-50, +200) 0.0004 0.0125 0.9900 0.0107 1.2943 0.1956
(-50, +170) 0.0081 0.2407 0.8098 0.0097 1.282 0.1998
(-50, +140) 0.002 0.0591 0.9529 0.008 1.1648 0.2441
(-50, +110) -0.0024 -0.1036 0.9175 0.0116 1.8123 0.0699
 41 deals; $US 800,103.55 Average 
Value per deal $US19,514.72 
million
1445 deals; $USD 1,284,657.52 
Million
This table shows the Short and Long Horizon event studies results showing 
CARs and BHARs and their relevant t-statistics, segregating Mega mergers 
deals (combined total assets value is greater than or equal $US 10 Billion) and 
non- Mega deals. Red shadowed probabilities refer to the significance of 
abnormal returns at 95% confidence, and green ones are at 90% confidence. 
Number and value of deals under each category are appended at the end of 
the relevant column. Frequency and Sampling Weights are set to be 
Countries (CountryNum).
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Table IX Short and Long Horizon Abnormal returns and the effect of the deal's currency.
 USD Other Currencies (Local) Euro GBP 
Window CAAR t-Test Time 
Series
Prob. CAAR t-Test 
Time Series
Prob. CAAR t-Test 
Time Series
Prob. CAAR t-Test 
Time Series
Prob.
(-40, +40) 4.6107 751.1014 0.0000 -0.003 -0.3115 0.7554 -0.005 -0.4455 0.6560 -0.031 -1.9555 0.0505
(0, 0) -0.0084 -12.2967 0.0000 0.0037 3.4231 0.0006 -
0.0012
-0.9785 0.3278 -0.0008 -0.4379 0.6615
(-1, +1) -0.0108 -9.1004 0.0000 0.0048 2.5357 0.0112 -
0.0006
-0.2987 0.7652 -0.0002 -0.0776 0.9381
(-1, +3) -0.0111 -7.2482 0.0000 0.0027 1.0991 0.2717 -
0.0034
-1.2109 0.2260 0.0011 0.2704 0.7869
(-1, +5) -0.011 -6.1117 0.0000 0.0015 0.5213 0.6022 -
0.0064
-1.9543 0.0507 0.0021 0.4485 0.6538
 BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- Value BHAR Skewne
ss Adjusted
p- Value BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- 
Value
BHAR Skewne
ss Adjusted
p- 
Value
(-50, +230) -0.0086 -0.7088 0.4784 0.0532 3.0401 0.0024 -0.007 -0.3414 0.7328 0.0116 0.4881 0.6255
(-50, +200) -0.0117 -1.0265 0.3046 0.049 3.0047 0.0027 -
0.0024
-0.1113 0.9114 0.0208 0.846 0.3975
(-50, +170) -0.0115 -1.0939 0.2740 0.0458 3.0305 0.0024 0.0042 0.2615 0.7937 0.0069 0.321 0.7482
(-50, +140) -0.017 -1.9165 0.0553 0.0446 3.2668 0.0011 0.0087 0.5393 0.5897 0.0088 0.4288 0.6681
(-50, +110) -0.0151 -1.7752 0.0759 0.0477 3.757 0.0002 0.015 1.0036 0.3156 0.0155 0.8066 0.4199
 651 deals; $US 995,498.22 Million 453 deals; $US 498,484.17 Million 264 deals; $US 403,953.93 Million 117 deals; $US 186,823.75 
Million
This table shows the Short and Long Horizon event studies results showing CARs and BHARs and their relevant t-statistics, segregating deals 
where payments were made in US dollars, Euro, British Pound (GBP) and other currencies that are bidders’ local currencies other than $US, Euro, 
and GBP. Red shadowed probabilities refer to the significance of abnormal returns at 95% confidence, and green ones are at 90% confidence. 
Number and value of deals under each category are appended at the end of the relevant column. Frequency and Sampling Weights are set to be 
Countries (CountryNum).
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Table X Short and Long Horizon Abnormal returns and the effect of the deal's currency.
 Stock Cash Cash or Stock Undisclosed
Window CAAR t-Test Time Series Prob. CAAR t-Test Time 
Series
Prob. CAAR t-Test Time 
Series
Prob. CAAR t-Test Time 
Series
Prob.
(-40, +40) -0.027 -2.6113 0.0090 3.9479 620.1382 0.0000 -0.0256 -1.7462 0.0808 -0.0239 -1.5349 0.1248
(0, 0) -0.0102 -8.8729 0.0000 0.002 2.7759 0.0055 -0.0177 -10.864 0.0000 0.002 1.1387 0.2548
(-1, +1) -0.0112 -5.6065 0.0000 0.002 1.6671 0.0955 -0.024 -8.5141 0.0000 0.0032 1.0627 0.2879
(-1, +3) -0.0146 -5.6767 0.0000 0.0016 1.0403 0.2982 -0.0232 -6.3752 0.0000 0.0021 0.5467 0.5846
(-1, +5) -0.0176 -5.8016 0.0000 0.0019 1.0169 0.3092 -0.0229 -5.3286 0.0000 0.0021 0.4635 0.6430
BHAR Skewness Adjusted p- Value BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- Value BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- 
Value
BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- 
Value
(-50, +230) -0.0016 -0.0749 0.9403 0.0295 2.5453 0.0109 -0.0009 -0.0181 0.9856 0.0026 0.1012 0.9194
(-50, +200) -0.0032 -0.1623 0.8711 0.0297 2.7903 0.0053 -0.0098 -0.3072 0.7587 -0.0076 -0.3398 0.7340
(-50, +170) -0.0066 -0.368 0.7129 0.0313 3.2469 0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0498 0.9603 -0.0214 -0.9827 0.3258
(-50, +140) -0.0058 -0.3598 0.7190 0.028 3.2792 0.0010 -0.0167 -0.6517 0.5146 -0.0147 -0.7003 0.4837
(-50, +110) -0.0088 -0.6091 0.5425 0.034 4.2436 0.0000 -0.004 -0.1491 0.8815 -0.015 -0.7439 0.4570
367 deals; $US 953,552.4 Million 780 deals; $US 686,141.7 91 deals; $US 80,434.94 Million 103 deals; $US 55,704.54
Cash and Debt Stock and Debt Cash, Stock and Debt Cash and Stock
CAAR t-Test Time Series Prob. CAAR t-Test Time 
Series
Prob. CAAR t-Test Time 
Series
Prob. CAAR t-Test Time 
Series
Prob.
(-40, +40) -0.0051 -0.0933 0.9256 0.0614 0.7317 0.4644 -0.1125 -1.6008 0.1094 -0.0285 -2.0938 0.0363
(0, 0) 0.0148 2.4105 0.0159 -0.0128 -1.3685 0.1712 -0.0006 -0.0721 0.9425 -0.0075 -4.99 0.0000
(-1, +1) 0.028 2.6379 0.0083 -0.0077 -0.4758 0.6343 -0.0112 -0.83 0.4065 -0.0101 -3.8783 0.0001
(-1, +3) 0.0285 2.0839 0.0372 0.0211 1.0102 0.3124 -0.0075 -0.4319 0.6658 -0.0118 -3.5038 0.0005
(-1, +5) 0.0129 0.7985 0.4246 0.0206 0.8335 0.4045 -0.0193 -0.9348 0.3499 -0.0115 -2.8676 0.0041
BHAR Skewness Adjusted p- Value BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- Value BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- Value BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- Value
(-50, +230) 0.0281 0.3056 0.7599 -0.2671 -1.4291 0.1530 -0.1835 -1.0033 0.3157 -0.0329 -1.3183 0.1874
(-50, +200) 0.0513 0.4947 0.6208 -0.1797 -0.8887 0.3741 -0.1869 -1.3373 0.1811 -0.0329 -1.387 0.1654
(-50, +170) 0.0432 0.526 0.5989 -0.1757 -0.8587 0.3905 -0.1242 -0.9458 0.3443 -0.0389 -1.8643 0.0623
(-50, +140) -0.0019 0.0472 0.9624 -0.1844 -1.0757 0.2821 -0.1719 -1.351 0.1767 -0.0285 -1.363 0.1729
(-50, +110) -0.0195 -0.1529 0.8785 -0.1263 -1.2685 0.2046 -0.1551 -1.2592 0.2079 -0.0257 -1.2436 0.2137
16 deals; $US 17,991.21 Million 3 deals; $US 1,814.94 Million 7 deals; $US 11,712.4 Million 118 deals; $US 277,408.94 Million
This table shows the Short and Long Horizon event studies results showing CARs and BHARs and their relevant t-statistics, segregating deals where 
payments was made using “Stock”, “Cash”, “Cash or Stock”, “Cash and Debt”, “Stock and Debt”, “Cash, Stock and Debt”, “Cash and Stock”, or 
“Undisclosed”. Red shadowed probabilities refer to the significance of abnormal returns at 95% confidence, and green ones are at 90% confidence. Number 
and value of deals under each category are appended at the end of the relevant column. Frequency and Sampling Weights are set to be Countries 
(CountryNum).
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Table XI Short and Long Horizon Abnormal returns and the effect of the 2007-2011 crisis.
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis
Window CAAR t-Test Time 
Series
Prob. CAAR t-Test Time 
Series
Prob. CAAR t-Test Time 
Series
Prob.
(-40, +40) -0.0206 -3.5397 0.0004 -0.0213 -1.5542 0.1201 6.8809 817.1345 0.0000
(0, 0) -0.0046 -7.1463 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.2552 0.7985 -0.0015 -1.5763 0.1150
(-1, +1) -0.0067 -5.996 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.2164 0.8287 0.0003 0.1711 0.8642
(-1, +3) -0.0082 -5.6931 0.0000 -0.0023 -0.6671 0.5047 0.0001 0.0532 0.9576
(-1, +5) -0.0084 -4.9346 0.0000 -0.0043 -1.0635 0.2875 -0.001 -0.4153 0.6779
BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- Value BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- Value BHAR Skewness 
Adjusted
p- Value
(-50, +230) 0.0168 1.4138 0.1574 -0.0617 -2.8511 0.0044 0.0445 3.1158 0.0018
(-50, +200) 0.0205 1.8158 0.0694 -0.0721 -3.3432 0.0008 0.0403 3.103 0.0019
(-50, +170) 0.0183 1.7727 0.0763 -0.0643 -2.8911 0.0038 0.037 3.1206 0.0018
(-50, +140) 0.0159 1.7171 0.0860 -0.0613 -3.1782 0.0015 0.0334 3.0807 0.0021
(-50, +110) 0.0174 2.0816 0.0374 -0.0557 -3.1525 0.0016 0.0388 3.7505 0.0002
 786 deals; $US 1,345,549.04 Million 258 deals; $US 340,587.5 Million 441 deals; $ USD 398624.53 Million
This table shows the short and Long Horizon event studies results showing CARs and BHARs and their 
relevant t-statistics, segregating FIs merger deals announcement (and completion) years over the three periods 
of Before, During and After the 2007-2011 financial crisis. Coefficients marked with *, ** and *** refer to the 
significance of abnormal returns at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively. Number and value of 
deals under each category are appended at the end of the relevant column. Frequency and Sampling Weights 
are set to be Countries (CountryNum).
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Figure 1 Financial Performance Time Line of FIs involved in a merger between 1995 and 2018.
Page 37 of 46 Journal of Financial Economic Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Economic Policy
Table XII Robust Regression analysis; Abnormal Returns, financial performance in the year of the merger announcement and Strategic Orientation.
Robust 
Regression 
Market Development; Banks-
Banks
Market Penetration; Banks-Banks Market Development; Real Estate-Real 
Estate
Market Penetration; 
Insurance-Insurance
Market 
Penetration; 
Real Estate-
Real Estate
Same Year 
Performance 
Obs 65 Obs 160 Obs 61 Obs 39
 CAR (-1, 
+3)
CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
CAR (-1, +3) CAR (-1, +3)
ROE -
0.0014707*
-0.3468653 0.0007821 2.045192** 0.0021258*** 2.09563** -0.0008509 -0.0002373
Liquidity -0.0031857 -14.40768* 0.0000949** -0.2965107** -0.000794 -1.275178* -0.0004301** 0.0061209***
Cost to Income 0.0025971 14.00848* 0.00006*** 0.087789 -0.0000637 -1.307759*** 0.0019636 0.0007373**
Net Loans to Assets -0.0565483 -26.7175 0.0247 54.37839* -0.0894411 53.91683 0.0337452 0.0246423
Credit Risk 0.0453678 43.58829 0.0209865 -30.88594*** 0.0700079** -40.27153* -0.0113013*** 0.1565389***
Loan to Deposits 0.0046081 6.434276* 0.0205675 -40.90026 0.0423713 -38.30496 -0.012658 -0.0907587
Other Expenses to 
Assets
-
0.0000233*
**
-
0.0317352***
0.0001118 0.1732917 0.000572 1.730377*** 0.0003024** -0.0057915***
EVA 0.00000002 0.0000325 0.0000000307*** -0.0000545** 0.000000162*** -0.0001307* -0.000000173 0.0000000984*
**WACC 0.0004873 3.884624 0.0016283 0.1354035 0.0021992 2.67792 -0.0041507 -0.008357*
ROIC 0.0019326 -2.11534 0.0011187 -2.519439*** -0.0029405 -9.393116** 0.0024671 0.0069195
_cons 0.0197869 19.41976 0.0222851 -27.63296 -0.0119943 -13.73741 -0.0073303 -0.0153292
F(10, 
54)
14.29 4.91 F(10, 149) 23.2 10.12 F(10, 50) 37.55 43.62 F(10, 28) 33.01 31.67
Prob
>F
0.000 0.000 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 Prob>F 0.000 0.000
R-
squar
ed
0.1927 0.0593 R-squared 0.0529 0.0895 R-squared 0.1945 0.28 R-squared 0.3159 0.3168
Root 
MSE
0.04444 84.806 Root MSE 0.04736 56.492 Root MSE 0.05693 50.306 Root MSE 0.04507 0.05591
Shows robust regression analysis results of CARs and BHARs over the financial performance variables of the year of the merger announcement, 
segregating FIs merger by deal types of Strategic Orientation (Diversification, Market or product development, and Market Penetration) and 
Product Orientation depending on Acquirers and Targets Industries. Coefficients marked with *, ** and *** refer to the significance of abnormal 
returns at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively. See Table XVII in appendix. Frequency and Sampling Weights are set to be 
Countries (CountryNum).
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Table XIII Robust Regression analysis; Abnormal Returns, financial performance in the year After the merger announcement and Strategic 
Orientation.
Robust Regression Market Development; Banks-Banks Market Development; Insurance-
Insurance
Market Penetration; Banks-Banks Market Penetration; Insurance-
Insurance
 Obs 71 Obs 43 Obs 161 Obs 39
A Year Post-Merger 
Performance
CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-
50, +230)
ROE 0.0028982*** 0.781982 0.0006869 0.1719623 -0.0001427 2.486423*** -0.0008073 -1.315937
Liquidity 0.0063084 15.32467 0.0347672*** -13.82004* -0.0004219*** -0.1830079 -0.000541 0.3954575
Cost to Income -0.0062645 -14.23463 0.0056897* -2.701778 0.0003211** 0.3667799*** 0.0021624 -2.352534
Capital to Assets 0.1433464** -8.84073 -0.1933884 -142.9384 0.0738723 52.86665 0.0342149 57.43691
Net Loans to Assets -0.0582309 -3.20035 -0.049972 -58.6119* 0.0173525 20.95892 -0.1606381 -40.48694
Credit Risk 0.0296996 75.30856 -0.0043892 -10.41328** 0.038759 -49.27295 0.124828** 37.15029
Loan to Deposits -0.0078122 -17.48053 -0.024253 16.72362 0.0002321 -33.82771*** -0.0996576 -66.99629
Other Expenses to 
Assets
-0.0000195*** -0.0358986*** -0.0345183*** 12.33046 0.0000765*** -0.0307389 0.0003446* -0.0132524
EVA -1.44E-08 0.0000322 0.000000375 -0.0005632** 0.000000264** -0.0002066 -0.000000336 0.0002313
WACC -0.003218 3.146886 0.0020048 0.4098839 0.0004137 -3.105825 -0.0005012 -3.256336
ROIC 0.0006336 -3.700579 -0.0035206 -3.819592 0.0001666 -1.608725 0.0055353 10.39938*
_cons -0.0189218 -1.460644 0.0458827 77.07224* -0.0363499 -2.294048 0.0515072 -2.597803
F(10, 59) 9.5 3.59 F(11, 32) 106.85 26.19 F(11, 149) 9.49 40.78 F(11, 28) 3.27 4.42
Prob>F 0.000 0.0007 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 Prob>F 0.0056 0.0007
R-squared 0.3921 0.0754 R-squared 0.232 0.1725 R-squared 0.0582 0.1312 R-squared 0.2936 0.2327
Root MSE 0.0559 80.957 Root MSE 0.04981 51.144 Root MSE 0.04461 58.449 Root MSE 0.05368 40.927
This table shows Robust Regression analysis results of CARs and BHARs over the financial performance variables of the year After the merger 
announcement, segregating FIs merger by deal types of Strategic Orientation (Diversification, Market or product development, and Market Penetration) 
and Product Orientation depending on Acquirers and Targets Industries. Coefficients marked with *, ** and *** refer to the significance of abnormal 
returns at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively. Frequency and Sampling Weights are set to be Countries (CountryNum).
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Table XIV Operating performance (measured by EVA, cost of capital and operating cost) and its association with Financial Institutions mergers and 
their strategic orientation.
Table XIII – Panel A
No. of Obs=41,332 CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, +230)
 Coefficient P>ItI Coefficient P>ItI
Cost to Income Ratio -8.79E-06 0.001 -0.01644 0.000
EVA -7.84E-09 0.000 -3.99E-06 0.000
WACC 0.000121 0.315 -0.55812 0.000
_cos -0.00704 0.000 5.543296 0.000
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq F P
CAR (-1, +3) 4 0.057044 0.002 25.77397 0.000
CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
4 51.88836 0.002 30.00813 0.000
Table XIII – Panel B
Multivariate Regression; Strategic Orientation is Product Development Multivariate Regression; Strategic Orientation is Diversification
No. of Obs=1,406 CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, +230) CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
No. of 
Obs=3,769 Coefficient P>ItI Coefficient P>ItI Coefficient P>ItI Coefficient P>ItI
Cost to Income 
Ratio
0.014115 0.000 -15.6127 0.000 -0.00015 0.000 -0.49359 0.000  
EVA 4.12E-09 0.115 2.36E-05 0.000 3.77E-08 0.000 -1.2E-05 0.243
WACC 0.00318 0.000 11.46715 0.000 0.001118 0.007 3.972954 0.000  
_cos -0.02493 0.000 -72.2897 0.000 -0.01019 0.000 -22.5278 0.000
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq F P Parms RMSE R-sq F P
CAR (-1, +3) 4 0.042804 0.0365 17.68376 0.000 4 0.04391
6
0.0096 12.2096
5
0.000
CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
4 42.52219 0.2189 130.9617 0.000 4 53.4981
8
0.0403 52.6400
7
0.000
Multivariate Regression; Strategic Orientation is Market Penetration Multivariate Regression; Strategic Orientation is Market Development
No. of Obs=19,496 CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
No. of 
Obs=16,661 Coefficient P>ItI Coefficient P>ItI Coefficient P>ItI Coefficient P>ItI
Cost to Income 
Ratio
-1.6E-05 0.000 -0.01419 0.000 0.000154 0.000 -0.04353 0.003  
EVA -5.73E-09 0.008 -1.45E-06 0.382 -9.98E-09 0.000 -2.37E-06 0.058
WACC -0.00072 0.000 -1.27297 0.000 0.000867 0.000 -1.04804 0.000  
_cos 0.00294 0.037 9.488878 0.000 -0.01855 0.000 10.15877 0.000
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq F P Parms RMSE R-sq F P
CAR (-1, +3) 4 0.063218 0.0024 15.5536 0.000 4 0.05200
7
0.0134 75.3407
9
0.000
CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
4 48.8159 0.0053 34.60747 0.000 4 54.8563
9
0.0032 17.7675
6
0.000
Multivariate Regression of operating performance components of economic value, cost of capital and operating cost. Panel A represents the overall 
significance of these variables' association with FIs' abnormal returns upon merger announcement. Panel B presents the variation of this association 
over the strategic orientation of FIs mergers. The coefficients are in first columns of every panel while p values are in the fourth ones. Frequency 
and Sampling Weights are set to be Countries (CountryNum).
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Table XV Economic Value addition and performance around merger anouncement. 
Robust 
Regression
Panel A
Cross State US Banks-Banks Bank-Bank merger Latin America Australasia Banks-Banks Europe Bank cross border
 Obs=54 Obs = 13 Obs=19 Obs 42
 EVA Post Merger
CAR (-1, +3) 20237.11** -468409.5 429415.7 1965.034
CBHAR (-50, +230) 2.423524 206.2443** -185.1926 40.71887**
ROE -175.7424** 2631.09* -4283.366** -328.1574***
Liquidity 24.11002** 2134293** -17413.35 -11717.31**
Cost to Income 
Ratio
-21.0164* -26000000** -35565.96 -1882.315
Capital to T. Assets 
Ratio
-7293.322 327336.2** -553307.5*** 26835.31**
Net Loans to T. 
Assets
8651.614** 250049.3*** -323583.5*** -10212.41
Credit Risk -1630.95 -187556.2** 141990.6 -37299.16***
Loan to Deposits -4795.465 -51466.13 208700.1** -5853.8*
Other Expenses to 
T. Assets
7.504181 3505731* 107852.5 8451.358*
ROIC 161.8176 5343.25* 4221.176 4162.659***
_cons -2650.029 -262037** 292014.9*** -3266.464
F(11, 42) 1.41 F(8, 1) 0.00 F(11, 7) 36.48 F(8, 1) 4.86
Prob>F 0.2052 Prob>F 0.00 Prob>F 0 Prob>F 0.0003
R-squared 0.3559 R-squared 1.00 R-squared 0.9007 R-squared 0.8199
Root MSE 2693.5 Root MSE 3615.5 Root MSE 25786 Root MSE 8081.2
 Cross state US Real Estate-Real Estate Intrastate US Real Estate-Real estate
Banks-Banks Europe Panel B Banks-Banks Latin America
 Obs=36 Obs=26 Obs = 58 Obs = 13
 EVA Post Merger EVA Change yr0 to yr1
CAR (-1, +3) -819.4283 -615.2755 1932.645 -277169
CBHAR (-50, +230) -2.346906 4.173344 -9.923377*** 99.03645**
ROE -83.803*** 12.35598 -34.08451 2037.822*
Liquidity -1.844659 -17.87445* -633.8743* 6576655***
Cost to Income 
Ratio
-3.094869** 2.650679 1686.825 69900000***
Capital to T. Assets 
Ratio
-2726.363 -8254.57** -5135.221 184041.3**
Net Loans to T. 
Assets
7.539856 -613.251 9504.617** 170526.9***
Credit Risk 316.4703 -283.3951 14383.16*** -113479.2**
Loan to Deposits -2617.614* -1371.432 2066.031 -47886.36
Other Expenses to 
T. Assets
4.503511 6.616352 -1419.519 -34700000***
ROIC -80.06304 -237.2255** -907.7629*** 1374.69
_cons 1639.581 3035.749*** -4131.989  -151410.3**
F(11, 34) 3.83 F(11, 14) 1.38 F(11,46) 40.45 F(8,1) 0.000
Prob>F 0.0029 Prob>F 0.2818 Prob>F 0.000 Prob>F 0.000
R-squared 0.5796 R-squared 0.6348 R-squared 0.8036 R-squared 1.000
Root MSE 558.47 Root MSE 612.72 Root MSE 4811.7 Root MSE 2165.6
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Shows the Robust Regression of Economic Value addition post-merger over the short and long horizons abnormal returns and other financial 
accounting variables in the year of the merger. Coefficients marked with *, ** and *** refer to the significance of abnormal returns at 90%, 95% 
and 99% confidence levels respectively. See table XVII in appendix for elaborative regression of operational performance through Cost to Income 
ratio, Operating Profit (NOPAT in EVA calculation) and Cost of capital (WAAC). Frequency and Sampling Weights are set to be Countries 
(CountryNum).
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Appendix A: The accounting adjustments made to move the book values closer to their 
economic values in the EVA calculation.
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Table XVI Multivariate regression of CARs and BHARs over financial performance variables two years before the merger announcement.
Robust 
Regression
Diversification Obs=35 Market Development Obs=143 Market Penetration Obs=195 Product Development Obs=14
Two Years Pre-
Merger 
Performance
CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-
50, +230)
CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, +230)
ROE -0.00081 0.493893 0.0000333*** 0.0122276*
**
0.000629 0.8304693* -0.00413 4.243164
Liquidity -0.01235 -17.3819 0.000465 0.522244 -0.00054 0.433553 0.06619 -537.835
Cost to Income -0.00192 -3.1823 0.000133 0.521256 -2E-05 0.084807 0.028862 170.9193
Capital to Assets 0.312825 196.7809 0.052442 43.53461 0.034268 -31.9674 -0.04836 80.88622
Net Loans to 
Assets
0.06362 -50.0106 -0.04521 10.97076 0.000386 41.19885 -0.29034 -435.16
Credit Risk 0.04249 -31.245 0.017143 23.42489 -0.02308 -5.07881 -0.17824 -242.576
Loan to Deposits -0.06048 -103.184 0.002186 0.573171 -0.02251 12.43426 0.169484 -358.238
Other Expenses to 
Assets
0.004718 6.783879 -0.00014 -0.51602 0.000036 -0.03305 -0.05888 338.8598**
EVA -0.00000032* -4.8E-05 2.22E-09 0.0000717*
**
-2.8E-08 0.000014 3.04E-07 4.43E-05
WACC -0.01009 2.988828 0.000597 0.790969 0.0027598* 0.768753 0.010925 24.67994
ROIC 0.0100773* 0.16868 0.001529 -2.529476* -0.00052 -0.854 0.0008335** -0.6594336**
_cons -0.08153 -6.89873 -0.01519 1.074158 -0.02432 -31.3213 0.190577 156.5659
F(11, 23) 2.4 218.68 F(11, 131) 216.93 15.31 F(11, 183) 1.01 0.85 F(10, 2) 0.000 0.000
Prob>F 0.0371 0.000 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 Prob>F 0.4357 0.588 Prob>F 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.3226 0.0965 R-squared 0.1136 0.0383 R-squared 0.0616 0.0439 R-squared 0.9291 0.9141
Root MSE 0.04615 82.61 Root MSE 0.05287 67.306 Root MSE 0.04334 46.638 Root MSE 0.0302 33.139
Shows robust regression analysis results of CARs and BHARs over the financial performance variables of the Two years Before the merger 
announcement segregating FIs merger by deal types of Diversification, Market Development, Market Penetration and Product Development. 
Coefficients marked with *, ** and *** refer to the significance of abnormal returns at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively.
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Table XVII Mixed Effect Maximum Likelihood regression analysis of CARs and BHARs.
Mixed Effect Maximum 
Likelihood
Acquirer is a 
Bank
Banks-Banks Banks-Insurance
Same Year Performance Obs = 532 Obs = 268 Obs=14
 CAR (-1, +3) CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
CAR (-1, +3) CBHAR (-50, 
+230)
ROE -0.000107 -0.0006445 0.2825468 0.0007199 1.190023
Liquidity 0.0000318*** -
0.0002066**
*
-0.1853883*** 0.7017472*** -952.0654***
Cost to Income -0.0000221*** 0.0002251**
*
0.1939322*** -
0.6231185***
839.3732***
Net Loans to Assets -0.0251165*** -0.022541* 16.07988 -
0.1607536***
32.81271**
Credit Risk -0.0054364 0.0127069 -2.928893 0.1312541*** -238.3513***
Loan to Deposits 0.0022413 0.0049707 -5.368608 0.0258868* 32.53
Other Expenses to Assets -0.000013*** -
0.0000213**
*
-0.0218421*** -
0.4378624***
594.0668***
EVA 2.86E-09 1.42E-08 -0.00000161 -
0.000000771*
*
0.0005452***
WACC 0.00114 0.0018389 -0.1230434 0.0120207*** -4.895462
Wald chi(9) 73356.88 76740.62 64996.22 0 0
Log pseudolikelihood 829.2175 424.0296 -1491.71 33.82578 -64.4736
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0 0
Country of Acquirer Clustered Robust, Mixed Effect Maximum Likelihood regression 
analysis results of CARs and BHARs over the financial performance variables of the year of 
the merger announcement, segregating FIs merger by deal types of Acquirer Industry and 
deal Orientation (Diversification, Market or product development, and Market Penetration). 
Coefficients marked with *, ** and *** refer to the significance of abnormal returns at 90%, 
95% and 99% confidence levels respectively. N.B. GLM Gaussian distribution regression 
over same clusters resulted similarly.
Page 45 of 46 Journal of Financial Economic Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Economic Policy
Page 46 of 46Journal of Financial Economic Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
